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1 OVERVIEW
The Spanish economy is undergoing difficult economic circumstances as a result of the 
prolongation and worsening of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, and the renewed dip 
into recession before the weak recovery was able to take root. In the very short run, the 
outlook remains conditional upon the need to correct the imbalances outstanding and to 
redress the weaknesses that have emerged during the crisis, which will require seeing 
adjustments through and will limit growth possibilities. However, pursuing an ambitious 
agenda of restructuring and reform will help restore the macroeconomic equilibria and 
competitiveness needed to resume a sound growth path in the medium term. It will also 
prevent the economy from being trapped in a low-growth scenario over a protracted pe-
riod of time.
The quicker that the adjustments are completed and that the weaknesses which have 
placed the economy in a position of vulnerability are addressed, the sooner the founda-
tions for sound growth will be restored and the greater the protection afforded against the 
shocks and accidents that may arise in the still-unstable euro area scenario. This is be-
cause while the unfolding of the sovereign debt crisis will remain a significant external 
constraint, the country’s responsiveness and the appropriate reaction by its agents will 
more than ever determine how the difficult juncture at which the economy stands can be 
overcome.
To outline the essential features of this situation and the economic policy challenges posed 
by it, this chapter commences with an analysis of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. It 
subsequently delves into the key factors characterising the difficult circumstances of the 
Spanish economy, with particular attention to the imbalances and institutional inefficien-
cies bearing down on recovery. Finally, it highlights the major role that economic policy has 
to play. Chapter 2 in this Report is dedicated singularly to competitiveness. This is a cor-
nerstone of the Spanish economy’s adjustment within the Monetary Union, all the more so 
given that it is vital that all institutional sectors should reduce their level of debt and that 
the economy as a whole should lessen its dependence on external saving.
The recovery in the world economy that began in 2010 did not see continuity last year (see 
Chart 1.1). The growth rate of global output fell back 1.4 pp (from 5.3% to 3.9%), and the 
decline was more marked in the advanced economies. Euro area GDP advanced at a slug-
gish rate, similar to that of the previous year (1.4% against 1.9% in 2010) and the result of 
behaviour that differed not only across its Member States, but also over time. While rela-
tively expansionary in the first six months, the dynamism of growth was diminished in the 
second half of the year. This slowdown in global activity has progressively steadied over 
the first half of 2012 and, as this Report goes to press, most economic indicators point to 
some stabilisation which, on most forecasts, would translate into a further – though limited – 
easing in the expansion of both the most advanced and the emerging economies over the 
year as a whole.
Initially, emergence from the global crisis was interrupted owing to a series of shocks, such 
as the tsunami in Japan and its effects on the Fukushima nuclear power plant, and the 
outbreaks of political instability in the Arab countries. These bore down on financial mar-
kets and on international trade. Later, however, the focal point of tensions tended to shift 
towards the exacerbation and extension of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, ultimately 
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acting during 2011, but also in 2012 to date, as a key conditioning factor of the economic 
performance of the euro area in general, and of Spain in particular.
The tensions on euro area government debt markets had continued until summer last year, 
concentrated in a relatively limited group of countries (see Chart 1.2). Thereafter, however, 
they began to spread to a greater number of Member States, primarily affecting those 
showing more vulnerable economic fundamentals and, later, even those in sounder posi-
tions. As a result, the European debt crisis ultimately took on a systemic dimension. The 
causes leading to this key qualitative change are numerous and complex; but, in any 
event, the shortcomings in the area’s institutional arrangements for governance and deci-
sion-making in the face of the crisis have had a notable influence.
At the source and immediate onset of the tensions on the euro-denominated govern-
ment debt markets, a central role was played by a group of member countries’ policies, 
the pursuit of which revealed an insufficient understanding of the scope and economic 
consequences of belonging to a monetary union. Following policies that were hardly 
consistent with stability in the Monetary Union had given rise to a build-up of various 
imbalances, which placed the economies concerned in a position of vulnerability to 
potential shocks such as those which, unfortunately, began to materialise in the second 
half of the past decade.
The euro area sovereign debt 
crisis became systemic and 
was one of the main factors 
responsible for the interruption 
of world growth
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Practically from the very start of Monetary Union and despite the Treaty’s provisions, some 
governments failed to exert sufficient control over public finances, which resulted in defi-
cits and debt that were hardly compatible with the demands of a common monetary poli-
cy. Fragilities emerged in other equally important areas, as seen in the high levels of private 
debt accumulated, the weakening of financial systems and continuing rigidities in price 
and wage-formation mechanisms which, in the short term, constrain economies’ ability to 
absorb adverse shocks and, over a longer horizon, reduce their growth potential. Recent 
events have highlighted the close links between sovereign risks, banking risks and eco-
nomic vulnerability, and how, once any of these three components is activated, feedback 
loops are set in train that exacerbate and deepen tensions (see Box 1.1).
The effects of these distortions were amplified as a result first, of a relatively complacent and 
benign view of the imbalances generated, and one strongly anchored in the euro’s success 
during its first 10 years; and further, of excessive confidence in the strength of a series of 
adjustment mechanisms which, it was assumed, would be activated were these imbalances 
to breach specific safety thresholds. Unfortunately, neither the competitiveness channel, 
which should have induced price and cost containment in those economies that were ac-
cumulating growing external misalignments, nor the market discipline channel, which should 
have penalised the financing of these imbalances with higher risk premia, functioned as 
expected. The former channel was deactivated by the persistent lack of flexibility of the 
price and wage-formation mechanisms, if not directly by the prevalence of dysfunctional 
factor and product markets. And the latter was cancelled out by the widespread underesti-
mation of the risks not only on European financial markets but also internationally.
All these factors, while central, do not explain why, as from summer 2011, the tensions 
also spread to Member States whose policies and economic fundamentals had not devi-
ated significantly from stability. To understand the systemic dimension of the crisis, other 
factors closely linked to a series of weaknesses in European governance and to the pro-
cess followed by the European authorities to overcome them must be incorporated into 
the analysis. Indeed, the process fell far short of the diligence and effectiveness that the 
seriousness of the circumstances required, as shown by the management of the grave 
problems assailing the Greek economy.
The destabilising potential of fiscal imbalances within a monetary union was explicitly ac-
knowledged by the founders of EMU. The Maastricht Treaty envisaged a formal budgetary 
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BOX 1.1THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN SOVEREIGN RISK AND BANK RISK
The strong interrelation between financial crises and sovereign 
debt crises is an empirical regularity extensively documented in 
the literature. From a broad historical perspective, systemic bank-
ing crises have tended to be followed by public debt crises, so 
that the former “help to predict” (in the statistical sense of the 
term) the latter1. The mechanism through which this link takes 
place is well known: financial crises tend to turn into severe eco-
nomic crises leading to pronounced falls in budgetary revenues 
and increases in public sector spending and debt, which may ulti-
mately put in doubt the sustainability of public finances. If, moreo-
ver, governments have to give direct financial support to their 
banking systems, the problems are aggravated.
However, episodes in which banking crises and sovereign debt 
crises have developed (and fuelled each other) in parallel have not 
been rare either. In fact, the relationship between them tends to be 
bidirectional, with another causal nexus, existing alongside the 
one described above, operating in the opposite direction through 
various channels. First, the fall in government bond prices directly 
affects2 the value of the debt holdings on the institutions’ balance 
sheets. In addition, the contractionary fiscal policies deployed in 
response to possible problems of public finance sustainability 
typically involve a lower level of economic activity in the short 
term, which may lead to an increase in doubtful loans. For their 
part, the deterioration in the quality of bank assets and the associ-
ated worsening of the earnings outlook result in a tightening of fi-
nancing conditions, which may involve the loss of access to the 
markets in the most extreme cases in which bank solvency is 
called into question. The power of this transmission channel is 
also amplified by the special role played by public debt in the fi-
nancing of banks, being used as collateral and, especially, in repo 
transactions between private institutions or with the central bank. 
A sharp deterioration in the quality of sovereign assets raises the 
haircuts applied in the valuation of the collateral, and ultimately the 
asset may even lose its eligible asset status. Finally, a particularly 
powerful channel of transmission of sovereign risk to bank risk is 
the fact that the credit rating of the sovereign frequently places a 
limit on that of the domestic banks and, therefore, on their cost of 
financing. This is because the solvency of the public sector ulti-
mately determines its capacity to provide support to institutions in 
difficulty and, therefore, the value of the implicit (sometimes also 
explicit) public guarantees which support banks and supplement 
their stand-alone ratings. Naturally, most of these effects tend to 
be less powerful in more disintermediated systems, in which the 
bulk of financial flows are channelled by the markets and not by 
the banks.
Panel 1 illustrates how the tensions deriving from the 2007 global 
financial crisis were transmitted to the euro area sovereign debt 
markets, resulting in a progressive widening of the interest rate 
differentials (which had previously remained very compressed 
since the creation of the euro area in 1999). However, it was not 
until spring 2008 that significant differentiation between countries 
began to take place. The crisis in the euro area acquired its own 
dynamic between end-2008 and the start of 2009, following the 
Lehman bankruptcy and the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank in 
Ireland, but especially with the outbreak of the crisis in Greece in 
late 2009 and early 2010. According to studies published by the 
International Monetary Fund3, it was precisely at that time that the 
financial, sovereign debt and growth crises showed stronger feed-
back and became more intertwined. The correlation between sov-
ereign credit risk and credit risk in the banking sector in the euro 
area has been clearly evident since the summer of last year (see 
Panel 2).
The interaction between sovereign and bank risk is not specific to 
the euro area, although some characteristics of the monetary un-
ion intensify this link. In fact, in the case of the euro area, the bank-
ing sector plays a predominant role in the channelling of credit to 
the economy, so that bank tensions have greater repercussions on 
economic activity. Also, the exposure of euro area banks to public 
debt is relatively high (see Panel 3) and shows a domestic bias that 
is most acute in those countries that have experienced the strong-
est tensions in the debt markets, with the exception of Ireland (see 
Panel 4). Despite this, the greater financial and real integration of 
the euro area means that the transmission of risks in the euro area 
is not limited to domestic banks, but extends beyond their borders 
through bank cross-country exposures. These circumstances, 
along with the governance problems of the area, revealed by the 
crisis, are conducive, in the absence of effective firebreaks, to 
contagion, with the problems developed in some countries even-
tually spreading to other countries that have fiscal weaknesses or 
greater dependence on external saving, thus enabling the crisis to 
become systemic. Finally, the weaknesses and fragmentation in 
the EU financial crisis management and resolution mechanisms 
have had a further destabilising effect and have contributed to a 
certain renationalisation of some market segments (see Box 4.2 in 
Chapter 4). The absence of a common crisis management and 
resolution authority offering sufficient protection to the States 
against liquidity crises not based on fundamentals means that the 
available fiscal support (potentially very costly, given the size of 
the domestic banking systems) has a strictly national dimension, 
which amplifies the possible vicious circles between public fi-
nance vulnerabilities and the banking sector.
1  C.M. Reinhart and K. Rogoff (2011), “From Financial Crash to Debt Cri-
sis”, American Economic Review, 101, pp. 1676-1706.
2  However, the reflection of the depreciation of the government bonds on 
institutions’ income statements may be limited by the accounting meth-
od employed. Thus, bonds in held-to-maturity portfolios are not availa-
ble for sale and are valued using an expected loss approach. Therefore, 
the banks recognise capital losses only if, as occurred in the case of 
Greek public debt, there is a possibility of restructuring or default by the 
borrower.
3  A. Mody and D. Sandri (2011), The Eurozone Crisis: How Banks and 
Sovereigns Came to be Joined at the Hip, IMF Working Paper WP/11/269.
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THE INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN SOVEREIGN RISK AND BANK RISK (cont’d)
SOURCES: European Banking Authority, ECB, Datastream and SNL.
a Net direct exposure to European sovereigns of the banks participating in the European Banking Authority's recapitalisation exercise (51 euro area and 14 non-euro 
area banks).
b In the aggregate bank balance sheet, domestic general government debt as a proportion of total euro area general government debt. 
c The bank index is the average of the individual bank CDS.
d Includes AAA countries (Germany, France, Netherlands and Austria), countries under assistance (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) and the other countries (Italy, Spain 
and Belgium). For the groups of countries they are calculated as the simple average of the individual correlations.  
INDEX OF CORRELATION BETWEEN BANK AND SOVEREIGN RISK PREMIUMS (CDS) (c)
Euro area countries (d)
All Under assistance AAA Other
2009-2012 (April) 87 88 85 88 52 47
Second half of 2011 85 65 95 92 93 30
United Kingdom United States
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
700 
Apr-08 Apr-09 Apr-10 Apr-11 Apr-12 
BANK SOVEREIGN 
bp 
  
2  RISK PREMIUM IN THE EURO AREA (AVERAGE CDS EXCLUDING GREECE) 
0 
125 
250 
375 
500 
625 
750 
0 
100 
200 
300 
400 
500 
600 
Apr-06 Apr-07 Apr-08 Apr-09 Apr-10 Apr-11 Apr-12 
COUNTRY AVERAGE STANDARD DEVIATION (right-hand scale) 
bp  
  
1  FIVE-YEAR SOVEREIGN SPREADS OVER THE BUND 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
IT GR ES PT FR DE AT BE FI NL IE LU 
DECEMBER 2009 JANUARY 2012 
EURO AREA DECEMBER 2009 EURO AREA JANUARY 2012 
  
4  DOMESTIC BIAS IN BANK PUBLIC DEBT PORTFOLIOS (b) 
%  
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
25th percentile Median 75th percentile 
NON-EURO AREA 
EURO AREA 
% risk-weighted assets 
  
3  SOVEREIGN EXPOSURE OF EUROPEAN BANKS (a) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 6 ANNUAL REPORT, 2011 1. OVERVIEW
discipline surveillance procedure, the Stability and Growth Pact, with ceilings for budget 
deficits and public debt. Yet the necessary mechanisms were not set in place so that these 
provisions of the treaty might be properly applied in practice, meaning that the Pact’s ef-
fectiveness was ultimately very limited. Conditions were even more lax regarding other 
economic policies, subject to less strict oversight procedures in terms of their theoretical 
definition and even lighter oversight in respect of their practical application. Coordination 
of these policies was structured around the so-called Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
(BEPGs), by means of which economic policy priorities were set. But oversight of each 
Member State’s degree of adherence to these priorities was based on mere information 
exchange and on peer pressure mechanisms, which proved relatively ineffective for push-
ing through far-reaching reforms. Finally, the irreversibility of monetary union and the suc-
cess reaped in its early years shaped a setting not conducive to reflection on potential 
crises and on the need to have mechanisms at hand to manage and overcome them. The 
institutional arrangements underpinning EMU lacked such an instrument, a shortcoming 
that prevented a flexible response at a sufficiently early stage of the tensions, which would 
probably have enabled such tensions to be confined and resolved more readily.
Under these conditions, action on several fronts was necessary to lessen the pressure. In 
the domestic policy realm, resolute action was needed by the economic authorities both 
to correct the vulnerabilities that had built up and, essentially, to make the required chang-
es to definitively align internal working arrangements to those proper to a monetary union. 
In terms of European governance, the challenge was to shore up the foundations in which 
the main cracks had been detected and to set in place effective mechanisms for crisis-
management and the provision of financial assistance. Finally, regarding monetary policy, 
it fell to the ECB to contribute to easing financial tensions through an effective liquidity 
supply and management policy without detracting from its capacity to react swiftly to any 
risk to price stability, which is its main objective and a necessary condition for growth, job 
creation and financial stability in the area.
Throughout 2011 and in 2012 to date, progress in these three areas has been uneven 
and not without difficulties. The headway made has occasionally been in response to 
conflicting interests, and the ups and downs experienced evidence the absence of a 
well-defined plan backed by a high degree of consensus. Notwithstanding, it should be 
acknowledged that significant steps have been taken, though there is still a consider-
able way to go.
Regarding domestic economic policies, there has been significant headway in a good 
number of the countries subject to greater tensions. Greater details in this connection are 
given in Chapter 4 of this Report. Broadly, however, mention may be made of the imple-
mentation of ambitious fiscal adjustment programmes, progress in the recapitalisation and 
restructuring of banking systems, and structural reforms in the labour market and in ser-
vices markets which, at a differing pace and degree of intensity, have been applied by 
these Member States’ governments, in some cases under the terms of conditionality prop-
er to the financial assistance programmes set in train. But experience has also shown the 
difficulties of defining with any precision the optimal pattern of bringing public finances 
back onto a sustainable path against the background of a strong economic downturn and 
the risk that, in this setting, governments may succumb to reform fatigue before they have 
finished overhauling structures in their respective economies. The long and eventful road 
that finally led to Greek public debt restructuring and the approval of this country’s second 
financial aid programme vividly illustrates the difficulties of these processes and the costs 
of not overcoming them quickly and effectively. And far from being confined to the econo-
Exiting this stressed scenario 
requires a three-pronged 
action plan…
… namely a re-gearing of 
domestic economic policies to 
align them to the area’s 
stability requirements…
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mies directly involved, such difficulties and costs have – against a backdrop of high sys-
temic uncertainty – tended to spread to other countries, especially those in a situation of 
greater vulnerability.
Turning to European governance, last year’s Annual Report anticipated the incipient pro-
gress made in the first half of last year in the field of fiscal policy. Of particular note is the 
strengthening of the Stability Pact, resulting specifically, among other factors, in greater 
emphasis being placed on prevention instruments, greater attention to debt ceilings and a 
higher degree of automaticity in the procedures for evaluating non-compliance and for 
setting heavier penalties under the corrective arm of the Pact. Later, along the same lines, 
a second package of measures was implemented aimed at reinforcing the framework 
within which domestic budgetary policies are monitored, and there is a new Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance to promote explicit recognition of the commitment 
to budgetary stability at higher levels of national legislation.
Along with progress in the fiscal realm, a new framework has been designed for the pre-
vention and correction of domestic (non-fiscal) and external macroeconomic imbalances, 
known as the Excessive Imbalance Procedure. This new framework is underpinned by an 
early-warning mechanism based on a broad set of indicators which, when complemented 
by timely economic analysis, should help to detect sufficiently in advance those situations 
of vulnerability that may jeopardise euro area stability and to set in place the measures 
needed to correct them.
Another significant innovation regarding governance in the area is the so-called “Euro-
pean Semester”, which sets a new timetable for the discussion in European fora of all 
matters pertaining to excessive deficit and imbalance procedures and to the national 
reform plans which should give expression to the commitments entered into by govern-
ments under the Euro Plus Pact and the Europe 2020 Strategy. The Euro Plus Pact is an 
inter-governmental agreement entered into by the euro area States and other EU mem-
bers aimed at reinforcing the commitment to pursue policies geared to growth and to 
improving competitiveness. The Europe 2020 Strategy succeeds the former Lisbon 
agenda and is an action and structural reform programme oriented to creating employ-
ment, raising productivity and increasing social cohesion. The Semester begins with the 
presentation by the European Commission of its Annual Report on Growth, where the 
economic policy priorities that European countries must tackle are set. In late Novem-
ber last year, the European Commission brought forward the presentation of the Report 
for the current year.
Since then, significant consensus has been forged in the euro area around the idea that the 
progress in fiscal consolidation should now be accompanied by a collective effort, tailored 
in each country to the particularities in place, to boost growth and employment. The de-
tails of what has become known as the “Growth Compact” for the euro, which would 
complement the previously established “Fiscal Compact”, are still under discussion in 
various fora. But the political backing the G8 and EU leaders have given to this initiative at 
their recent meetings in May in Chicago and Brussels, respectively, is significant.
Taking a longer view, the crisis is also highlighting the need for all these moves to be com-
plemented by the design of a more ambitious agenda. There may then be progress to-
wards a stronger and deeper economic union among the Member States, in which the 
degree of integration and transfer of monetary policy sovereignty attained may progres-
sively pervade other economic policy areas.
… a deep-seated reform of 
euro area governance …
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Significant headway has also been made in designing a permanent crisis-management 
mechanism, although it is here that the need for greater ambition, consensus and resolve 
by Governments is most clearly discernible. The bilateral loan arrangements underpinning 
the first financial aid programme for Greece paved the way for the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF). Temporarily, the EFSF was intended to bridge the gap in European 
governance caused by the absence of a formal mechanism for crisis management and the 
provision of financial support to Member States facing difficulties. Later, and now on a 
permanent basis, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was set up, and is scheduled 
to finally come on stream in July.
Evidently, designing a formal mechanism of this nature is a complex task. Strength and 
flexibility must be combined to maximise its capacity for success. And, at the same time, 
there must be no weakening of the incentives either for the ambitious fiscal consolida-
tion and structural reform programmes currently required to lay the foundations for sus-
tained medium-term growth, or for the continuing pursuit in years ahead of the orderly 
and consistent policies needed so as not to jeopardise stability in the area and the future 
of the common project. Yet the establishment of both the EFSF and the ESM has proven 
too slow and subject to excessive frictions, given the scale the crisis has reached at 
some points and the speed with which it has spread. Debate as to their size and the 
range of instruments with which they were equipped has, while necessary, taken longer 
than was desirable and has seen too much disagreement. Investors have perceived the 
difficulties of advancing in this area and, in the absence of consensus, have reacted 
showing greater mistrust.
In these conditions, the ECB and its monetary policy decisions have ultimately become the 
mainstay of stability in the area, providing relief and effective safety valves at times of 
greatest pressure. The ECB Council faced, in fact, a very complex situation throughout the 
year, particularly from the summer, when there was a significant turnaround in events. The 
path of recovery was interrupted and tensions re-emerged forcefully on debt markets, with 
certain key parts of the transmission mechanism deteriorating substantially. The ECB Gov-
erning Council reacted by adopting a series of measures aimed at confirming the expan-
sionary stance of monetary policy, at restoring the functioning of the transmission mecha-
nism and at short-circuiting the feedback loop between risks from the banking system, 
with great difficulties gaining access to funding, and the sovereign risk market; at that 
time, the feedback was seriously threatening the stability of the area.
As a result, during 2011 Q4 official interest rates were cut on two occasions, placing 
them at 1% for the main refinancing operations. The rates on the deposit and marginal 
lending facilities were set at 0.25% and 1.75%, respectively. In addition, significant 
unconventional measures were approved. The ECB resumed its Securities Market Pro-
gramme from 5 August and instituted a second Covered Bank Bond Purchase Pro-
gramme (including related Spanish instruments) in October. Furthermore, it reinforced 
its dollar liquidity providing mechanisms and cut the reserve requirement to 1% (down 
from 2%). In turn, in August and again in October, it extended the fixed-rate tender 
procedure with full allotment in all its operations (until necessary and, at least, until 
mid-2012), and it substantially lengthened the term of its liquidity loans to cover a very 
long period, of three years, in two special operations (the first in December 2011, and 
the second in February 2012) with which it injected a gross amount of over €1 trillion 
(see Chart 1.3). So as to prevent any shortfall in collateral from weakening the effective-
ness of these three-year LTROs, it also decided to temporarily extend the list of assets 
eligible as collateral.
… with particular attention to 
the design of a mechanism for 
crisis management and for 
providing financial support…
… and, in the shorter term, the 
contribution of the ECB in its 
natural sphere of influence
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The combined action on the triple front of national economic policies, European gov-
ernance reform and monetary policy, along with the approval of the second financial aid 
programme for Greece after completing the restructuring of Greek public debt held by 
private creditors, allowed an easing of pressure compared with the critical point reached 
in the final stretch of 2011. In particular, the ECB’s two three-year liquidity operations 
were decisive in checking an acceleration in tensions that threatened to become a 
deep-rooted problem and which, against a background of investor hypersensitivity, 
might ultimately have prompted a financial accident of immeasurable systemic conse-
quences, heightening sovereign risks in the process. By blocking off this potential 
transmission channel of the difficulties prevailing, valuable time was gained for govern-
ments to continue progressing on the other two fronts and for the measures previously 
adopted to begin to bear their initial fruits. Broadly, the main financial stress indicators 
have since tended to move on a declining trend, though they have held at excessively 
high levels. Also, spikes in tension have continued, as has been the case in May, and 
these, in combination with the high levels of indicators, evidence the need for further 
headway. In this process, it seems clear that it is now for Governments, responsible 
both for national economic policies and for the sound working of European govern-
ance, to show greater leadership.
The heightening of the sovereign debt crisis and its interaction with the situation of the fi-
nancial system acutely affected the Spanish economy, worsening its financing conditions 
and denting agents’ confidence. This broad outlook has been exacerbated by the slow-
down in activity in the euro area. And all at a time when job destruction and the unemploy-
ment rate were continuing to rise, when the imbalances built up during the upturn re-
mained difficult to absorb and when the need to redress the serious deterioration in public 
finances during the crisis was becoming imperative.
Against this backdrop, the muted recovery in the Spanish economy in the first half of 2011 
weakened as from the summer. Indeed, it was reversed in the final quarter, with GDP de-
clining at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.3%, placing the annual average growth rate at 
0.7%. This pattern of decline continued into the opening months of 2012 and has seen a 
new recession ensue.
Progress on these fronts, 
while uneven, has exerted a 
stabilising effect whose 
entrenchment will depend 
essentially on future actions 
by national Governments
3  The double-dip 
recession in the 
Spanish economy
The heightening of the 
sovereign debt crisis 
interrupted the fragile recovery 
in the Spanish economy, 
plunging it once more into a 
bout of recession
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SOURCE: ECB.
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The double-dip has added complications to the adjustment initiated three years earlier. 
The adjustment has in any event continued, turning on domestic demand. This latter vari-
able fell by 1.7% last year, with a negative contribution of the public and private compo-
nents of expenditure. The economy’s spending capacity has been much restricted by the 
adverse financial conditions, affected by the tension arising from the sovereign debt crisis 
and by the ongoing restructuring of the financial system described in Box 1.1. A further 
contributing factor has been the deterioration in labour prospects and the diminished val-
ue of wealth, which have fuelled an increase in uncertainty, a downturn in confidence and, 
in sum, a curtailing of the propensity to spend. Net external demand once again acted as 
a counterweight and, for the fourth year running, has mitigated the fall-off in domestic 
demand, contributing 2.5 pp to output growth, up on the previous year. In 2011, the in-
crease in net external demand was the result of export buoyancy, on one hand, and the 
sluggishness of imports from the rest of the world, on the other, which were impacted to a 
greater extent than in 2010 by the weakness of final demand. In the opening months of 
2012, national demand once again fell, while net external demand was positive once more.
On the supply side, all productive sectors showed diminishing momentum over the year. 
In the construction sector, where declines in value added were sharper, as has been the 
case since the crisis began, the decline in activity was centred above all on the non-resi-
dential construction segment, owing to the effect of the budgetary austerity plans on civil 
engineering works. Industrial activity scarcely picked up, despite the sound performance 
of exports in the face of the adverse trend of national demand. Lastly, the services sectors, 
which had shown greater resilience to the initial onslaught of the crisis, gradually lost mo-
mentum during 2011. This also reflected the extreme weakness of certain domestic ex-
penditure components, in particular household consumption. Employment showed no 
signs of picking up in 2011; indeed, the path of job destruction even intensified after the 
summer, running into the opening months of 2012.
There are no recent precedents of a double-dip recession in Spain, which poses significant 
questions about the Spanish economy’s capacity to respond. This severe episode has 
arisen as a result of the interaction of the effects of the deterioration in the sovereign debt 
crisis with the vulnerabilities generated by the difficulty of pushing through internal adjust-
ments and the inefficient workings of the economy, which are a drag on the recovery and 
an obstacle to a new path of sustained growth being restored.
Indeed, the double-dip recession has come about while the real estate adjustment is still 
ongoing, job destruction has not halted, the private sector is immersed in a complex pro-
cess of restoring competitiveness and of financial deleveraging, and the banking sector is 
undergoing a clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring process. And, at the same time, 
it is proving difficult to make headway with a severe fiscal consolidation under the de-
manding conditions of a scenario marked by the absence of growth. These factors bearing 
on the double dip are likewise conditioning an exit from this complex situation. An in-depth 
analysis of each of these factors will form the main thread of this section.
The construction sector remains subject to a severe adjustment process. The collapse in 
the real estate sector is contributing to lengthening the recessionary trends, albeit with a 
diminishing impact as the adjustment of the sector advances. The sluggishness of the real 
estate market continued in 2011 against the background of tighter financing conditions 
and weak income and wealth prospects. The slackness was felt both in supply, where the 
number of housing starts continued to fall, and in demand, where new house sales 
showed no signs of picking up. As a result, the stock of unsold housing scarcely fell, to 
The adjustment turned once 
more on domestic demand, 
which fell sharply, while net 
external demand once again 
mitigated this effect
And on the supply side all the 
productive sectors lost steam, 
while job destruction stepped 
up from the summer
There are no recent 
precedents of a double-dip 
recession, which poses 
serious questions as to the 
capacity to respond…
… which will depend on the 
completion of the real estate 
adjustment, the recovery in 
competitiveness and 
employment, the correction of 
the external deficit, the 
deleveraging of the private 
sector and the restructuring of 
public finances
The adjustment of the real 
estate sector continued in 
2011, albeit with a diminishing 
contractionary impact, while 
activity in the non-residential 
construction segment 
plummeted…
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the contrary of what was expected at the start of the year. The decline in house prices 
stepped up in 2011, with the trend running into the opening months of 2012. Accordingly, 
the accumulated decline in prices from their peak, in 2008 Q1, stands at 22% in nominal 
terms (27% in real terms), on a greater scale than that recorded in previous real estate 
cycles. Since the crisis began, the weight of investment in housing in GDP has fallen to 
less than 7% in 2011 (see Chart 1.4).
The bulk of the direct and indirect effects on activity triggered by the real estate collapse 
came about in the early stages of the economic and financial crisis. But some effects con-
tinued to emerge in 2011, amplified by the contractionary influence exerted by the non-
residential construction segment. Value added and employment across the construction 
industry as a whole contracted once more, due above all to the fall-off in investment in 
civil engineering works under the budgetary consolidation plans.
With a view to the immediate future, in an economic environment of low growth and con-
tinuing strict financial conditions, the following may be foreseen: residential demand will 
remain weak, there will be further declines in house prices and the absorption of the stock 
of unsold housing will proceed slowly, which will delay the recovery in residential invest-
ment. In turn, fiscal consolidation will exert an additional restrictive influence on the non-
residential construction segment.
The shortcomings in the functioning of the labour market have fuelled continuing job de-
struction and have exacerbated the depth of the crisis. The decline in employment began 
in early 2008 and has run into the opening months of 2012. To date, more than 2.5 million 
jobs have been lost, around 13% of the jobs existing at the start of 2008.
In 2011, job destruction intensified from the summer, replicating the double dip in output 
(see Chart 1.5). Admittedly, part of this additional deterioration in the labour market was 
attributable to steeper job losses in construction. But the obstacles the other productive 
sectors face in generating employment and the difficulties in reallocating productive fac-
tors across sectors should not be underestimated, indicative as they are of the failures in 
the functioning of the labour market and of product markets during the crisis. On the la-
bour supply side, there was an increase in the number of foreigners exiting the labour 
market in 2011. This was offset, however, by further increases in the female participation 
rate, whereby the labour force stabilised at the levels of the previous year. Unemployment 
rose substantially in 2011 and in 2012 to date, with the end-year figure showing more than 
…and will continue in 2012 in 
a recessionary economic 
environment marked by strict 
financial conditions
Job destruction intensified 
from the summer, 
exacerbating the depth of the 
crisis…
SOURCES: INE and Ministerio de Fomento. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
INVESTMENT IN HOUSING 
% of GDP 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
HOUSE PRICES 
% rate of change 
INVESTMENT IN HOUSING AND HOUSE PRICES 
 
CHART 1.4
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 ANNUAL REPORT, 2011 1. OVERVIEW
5 million unemployed. The unemployment rate climbed to 24.4% of the labour force in the 
opening months of 2012. Of these, approximately half were long-term unemployed.
Beyond the forceful knock-on effects on employment caused by the downsizing of the 
construction sector, the intensity of the effects of the crisis on employment can also be 
attributed to the delay in the adjustment of labour costs. Despite the severity of job de-
struction, economy-wide compensation per employee increased by 10% from 2008, al-
though unit labour costs (ULCs) fell by 1% owing to the high productivity gains arising as 
a result of the decline in employment.
Until 2010 there was no turnaround in wage dynamics, a fact which may be largely linked 
to the cut in public-sector wages and, to a lesser extent, to the demonstration effect it had 
on the private sector. Nonetheless, market-economy wages rose anew in 2011, after sta-
bilising the previous year. This was due to the impact of two of the features of the collective 
bargaining system that add most inertia: the preponderant role of inflation in determining 
wage increases, amplified by the effect of the indexation clauses, and the high proportion 
of industry-wide multi-year agreements, which hampers their adaptation to the specific 
circumstances of individual companies. In any event, in 2011 and in 2012 to date ULCs fell 
back further, assisted by productivity gains, which provided for an improvement in the 
relative position vis-à-vis the euro area countries (see Chart 1.6).
Inflation has been impacted by the weakness of activity in recent years, with increases in 
the core inflation rate lower than those in the euro area, except on specific occasions since 
2009 (see Chart 1.7). In 2011, inflation eased significantly in the closing months of the year 
once the base effects stemming from the VAT rise in July 2010 and those relating to the 
increase in tobacco and energy prices in the final stretch of 2010 were stripped out. As a 
result, the inflation differential became favourable to the Spanish economy once more, a 
trend that has continued into the opening months of 2012 and which is helping correct the 
positive differentials that built up during the upturn.
However here, too, price adjustment has been clearly insufficient to restore the com-
petitiveness lost since Spain joined the euro area and to offset, through a greater ex-
port impulse, the recessionary trend of domestic demand. Indeed, the real effective 
… which is largely due to the 
delay in the adjustment of 
labour costs…
… which, in their market 
component, rose once more
in 2011 owing to the 
preponderant role of inflation 
in wage bargaining
Achieving lasting 
improvements in 
competitiveness will require 
greater adjustments in costs 
and prices and genuine gains 
in productivity
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a 3GD$/ 2O@MHRG+@ANTQ%NQBD2TQUDXRDQHDR@QDKHMJDCNMSGDA@RHRNESGD0BNMSQNKRTQUDX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SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rate with sign changed.
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exchange rate against the euro area countries has appreciated moderately if the calcu-
lation is made in terms of consumer prices. That is in contrast to the gain in competi-
tiveness brought about by exchange rate adjustments in previous recessions, when 
the exchange rate was available as an economic policy instrument. The adjustment in 
the real exchange rate has been greater in terms of ULCs (it has depreciated by some-
what over 5%), although this has come about mainly through the gains in productivity 
induced by severe job destruction. True, this process may have prompted gains in ef-
ficiency in sectors and companies that had become excessively big or had not adapted 
to growing competitive demands, in a setting of financial laxity and strongly dynamic 
spending. But a significant portion of the apparent productivity gains solely reflects the 
intensity of the contraction in employment, and is not in response to genuine improve-
ments in productive efficiency, which are what are important for achieving lasting in-
creases in competitiveness. These developments highlight the slow, costly and imper-
fect functioning of the competitiveness channel, which is pivotal for making adjustments 
within a monetary union when, as is the case, the economy is in a situation of over-
indebtedness.
Since 2007, the external deficit has been substantially corrected, declining from 10% of 
GDP in 2007 to 3.4% of GDP in 2011. Underpinning this reduction has been the increase 
in exports and the marked weakness of imports evident in the contraction in domestic 
demand, while the adjustment of the real effective exchange rate has been moderate. The 
correction of the external deficit has come up against two factors which will continue to 
influence its pattern of adjustment over the most immediate horizon. First, the sizeable 
deficit on the energy balance, which reflects the great dependence of the productive struc-
ture and of domestic spending on energy imports, and whose negative impact on the cur-
rent account increases in situations of sustained energy price rises. And further, the scale 
of the component of net investment income payments, which has subtracted resources for 
an amount equivalent to 2.6% of GDP in 2011 (see Chart 1.8) and which is closely linked 
to the level attained by the International Investment Position (IIP), a more detailed analysis 
of which is given in Box 6.2 of this Report. 
The foreseeable persistence of both developments is a drag on attempts to permanently 
reduce external borrowing needs, and highlights the importance of reforms that may con-
tribute to mitigating this through the promotion of gains in competitiveness that are con-
ducive to swifter adjustments in the real exchange rate. Only thus may a lasting decline in 
borrowing needs and a reversal of the rising course of the IIP be attained, once the dimin-
ishing effect of the foreseeable weakness of domestic spending on the deficit has been 
exhausted. The external borrowing requirement has become a major factor of vulnerability 
of the Spanish economy in the face of the crisis. The erosion of confidence in the euro and 
the clogging up of wholesale funding markets have created more pressing problems for 
those countries with a greater dependence on external saving.
The high level of foreign debt ensuing from the strong dynamism of domestic expenditure 
that was largely financed by external saving can be related to the excessive laxity of fi-
nancing conditions prevailing during the upturn in the Spanish economy. These conditions 
fuelled a high build-up of debt by households and firms, and led to the excessive size of 
our banking system, leaving bank balance sheets skewed towards real estate-related 
risks. The need to correct these imbalances hampers recovery in the economy; it narrows 
the headroom available for increasing investment and consumption through resort to ex-
ternal borrowing, and it means expansion possibilities depend closely on the funds that 
can be internally generated to finance expenditure.
The current account deficit 
has fallen significantly, but 
there are two stumbling blocks 
that will influence its pattern of 
adjustment in the future
The reduction in debt is 
proceeding slowly, in line with 
the usual pattern in situations 
of real estate and financial 
crisis
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Recourse to credit has been particularly constrained as a result of the European sovereign 
debt crisis and its adverse repercussions on financing conditions in the Spanish economy. 
Given their role as a benchmark, high sovereign risk premia have translated into an across-
the-board tightening of Spanish financial intermediaries’ accessibility to funds, which in 
turn is feeding progressively through to households and firms. This pass-through appears 
to have been both through higher lending costs and through quantitative restrictions, al-
though banks have been able to exploit, until very recently, the cushion provided by the 
greater resort to deposits (which expanded continuously until mid-2011) and to short-term 
financing in the repo markets. The safety valves of quantitative restrictions, however, have 
been offering increasingly limited room for manoeuvre. In any event, market frictions and 
failures have emerged that have singularly affected the accessibility to loans of certain 
sectors particularly exposed, for conjunctural or structural reasons, to the crisis, as is the 
case with SMEs.
Experience shows that, in real estate and financial crises, lowering the debt of households 
and firms is usually a slow process necessarily involving a relatively lengthy initial phase of 
credit containment. In the current episode, moreover, the restrictions persisting on interna-
tional wholesale funding markets make it difficult for the deleveraging of the financial sys-
tem to turn essentially on increasing capital without affecting in some way the extension of 
loans. The deleveraging pattern followed by the Spanish private sector has so far been in 
line with this past path. In 2011, credit to the non-financial private sector contracted at a 
SOURCES: INE, Customs and Banco de España.
a The energy and non-energy balances are an estimate of the Banco de España drawing on Customs data.
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rate of around 4%, although significant sectoral differences were observed in the behav-
iour of this variable (see Chart 1.9). In the case of households the related rate was close to 
-2.5% (the rate of contraction was brisker in the first half of the year), while credit ex-
tended to non-financial corporations ran at a rate of around 4%, which has held relatively 
stable since. The concentration of household liabilities in mortgage loans with notably 
extended maturities helps explain their slower pace of adjustment.
Among corporations, the contraction was more marked in those sectors of activity such as 
construction and real estate development in which the prior accumulation of debt was 
greater and in which the level of activity was on too great a scale. The adjustment needed 
is, however, less in the case of large corporations that have used a significant portion of 
the funds they have raised to extend and diversify their business internationally and whose 
profitability depends to a lesser extent on the Spanish economy’s position in the cycle.
The implementation of budgetary consolidation plans is one of the fundamental condition-
ing factors of the exit route from the recession. The fiscal adjustment plan approved in 
2010 and endorsed in the 2011 State Budget affected, above all, public spending (public-
sector wages and employment and public investment), although it also entailed the elimi-
nation of certain tax deductions in force during the recession, along with some tax in-
creases. The aim of the plan was, in principle, consistent with the imperative need to 
redress the medium-term trajectory of public finances. But short-term contractionary ef-
The necessary restructuring of 
public finances is exerting 
contractionary effects in the 
short run and will condition 
the exit from the crisis
SOURCES: INE, ECB, Federal Reserve, UK .Ejce for National Statistics and Banco de España.
a Debt of noMjnancial corporations includes intercompany loans.
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fects would have to be generated, due both to the direct effect of general government 
conduct on activity (government consumption and public investment) and to the indirect 
effect on household disposable income as, for the second year running, households saw 
how the public component of net transfers was diminishing.
However, the fiscal outturn was not as envisaged and the budgetary deviation was sizea-
ble. Analysis of the factors underlying this slippage and of the difficulties in bringing public 
finances onto the path of adjustment established in the Stability Programme is part and 
parcel of the challenges facing economic policy in exiting the crisis; accordingly, this anal-
ysis is tackled in depth in the following section.
Over the past three years, the Spanish economy has made progress in correcting some of 
the macroeconomic imbalances built up, though it has done so unevenly and to an insuf-
ficient degree, as highlighted in the previous section. Notwithstanding, it continues to dis-
play factors of vulnerability that are the outcome of the interaction between protracted 
economic weakness and certain features of the institutional framework that have tended 
to amplify the impact of the shocks.
Overcoming the crisis and the necessary protection of the Spanish economy against poten-
tial external shocks require an economic policy with a firm medium-term orientation. Such 
a policy should allow the correction of the macroeconomic imbalances still in place to be 
completed, along with the in-depth restructuring of all sectors (firms, households, general 
government and financial institutions) and the reform of the institutional dysfunctions that 
have become patently evident in numerous areas of the economy, even though the specific 
measures needed may exert a contractionary effect in the short term. On the basis of the 
diagnosis made, a stance of this type requires the economic policy agenda to be structured, 
as has been the case, around the following three pillars: the restructuring of credit institu-
tions, the culmination of an ambitious fiscal consolidation process and progress in struc-
tural reforms, including most notably – given its high priority – that of the labour market.
In a setting such as the present, any sign of weakness in the financial system runs the size-
able risk of unleashing tensions on the debt market and setting in train perverse mecha-
nisms with feedback loops. To prevent these risks materialising, it is necessary to restore 
investors’ full confidence in the Spanish financial system. On the soundness of the system 
hinges the efficient financing of the economy, too, allowing the necessary deleveraging of 
the economy to be compatible with the availability of credit for solvent projects.
The clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring of the Spanish banking system began in 
2009. Since then, the objectives have gradually adjusted to the worsening economic and 
market conditions, which have amplified the scale of the problems and lessened the leeway 
available to resolve them. Box 1.2 describes in greater detail the measures adopted during 
2011 and in 2012 to date, which have progressively adapted the financial reform process to 
the requirements of changing circumstances. One particular bout of tension arose in May 
this year, in connection with the conversion into ordinary shares of the funds previously 
extended by the FROB to Spain’s fourth biggest lender. The changes made have essen-
tially been aimed at strengthening banks’ balance sheets through the dual means of capital 
and provisions, tailoring the size of the sector to the new economic scenario and resolving 
the governance and ownership problems that were weighing down part of the system.
In the short run, however, this broad approach to the clean-up, recapitalisation and re-
structuring of the system will certainly have to continue being complemented by one-off 
4  Policies for 
overcoming the crisis
The Spanish economy 
continues to display factors of 
vulnerability despite the 
progress in correcting its 
imbalances
The clean-up, recapitalisation 
and restructuring of the 
financial system is vital for 
restoring confidence and 
normalising the financing of 
the economy
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PROGRESS IN THE CLEAN-UP, RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING 
OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM
BOX 1.2
Throughout 2011 and in the opening months of 2012, the ongoing 
clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring of the Spanish banking 
system continued. The basic parameters of this process have had to 
adjust to the requirements of a new economic and financial scenario 
that has worsened both in Spain and in the rest of the euro area.
On 18 February 2011 the Government approved Royal Decree-
Law (RDL) 2/2011. This legislation raised the minimum required 
level of capital for banks with a view to reinforcing the soundness 
of the financial system and contributing to restoring investors’ 
confidence, which had been dented following the outbreak of fi-
nancial tensions further to the Irish crisis in autumn 2010. Specifi-
cally, a new solvency ratio was introduced, which had to be met 
maintaining core capital1 of at least 8% of risk-weighted assets, 
rising to 10% for those institutions in which the relative weight of 
funding from wholesale markets exceeded 20% and which had 
not placed at least 20% of their capital with third-party investors. 
The functioning of the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the 
Banking Sector (FROB by its Spanish acronym) was reformed so 
that, under specific conditions2, it could provide the necessary 
capital for institutions that could not obtain it on the market. The 
regulation set a timetable for compliance whose deadline was 30 
September. The final outcome of its application may be summa-
rised in the following figures: 13 out of a total of 114 registered 
institutions needed to raise their capital by a total amount of 
€13.39 billion, 9 of them did so resorting to private investors for a 
total of €5.84 billion, 3 required the assistance of the FROB for an 
1  The definition here is stricter than the previous one for Tier 1 capital, as 
it eliminates certain items such as preference shares (except those con-
vertible to 2014) and non-voting shares, and includes eligible instru-
ments subscribed by the FROB.
2  Obligation to sell the securities within five years, the need to submit a 
recapitalisation plan to the Banco de España, a seat for the FROB on the 
board of directors and, if a savings bank or IPS is involved, the obliga-
tion to transfer all financial business to a commercial bank using the 
mechanisms envisaged under RDL 11/2010.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a 3GHRjFTQDHRA@RDCNMSGDOQNUHRHNM@KDRSHL@SDSG@SSGD,HMHRSQXNE$BNMNLHB EE@HQR@MC"NLODSHSHUDMDRRG@RL@CDNESGDQDPTHQDLDMSRTMCDQ1#+
b 3GDRDVNTKCMNSADOQNUHRHNMRATSFQD@SDQB@OHS@KQDPTHQDLDMSR
c -NSHMBKTCHMFSGD@CCHSHNM@KB@OHS@KQDPTHQDLDMSR@QHRHMFEQNLSGDBKD@MTOOK@MRTALHSSDCAX!% !@MJH@@SSGDDMCNE,@X
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-NSHMBKTCHMFSGD4MMHLNODQ@SHNMVHSG@U@KTDNE©LHKKHNMRHMBD
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BOX 1.2PROGRESS IN THE CLEAN-UP, RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING 
OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM (cont’d)
amount of €4.75 billion3 and 1 institution was intervened and sub-
sequently sold by auction, with the Deposit Guarantee Fund pro-
viding €5.25 billion of the capital needed.4 In addition, virtually all 
the financial activity of savings banks was transferred to commer-
cial banks.
One of the first effects of this regulation on Spanish banks’ sol-
vency could be seen in the second stress test exercise conducted 
by the European Banking Authority (EBA), whose results were 
published on July 2011. As a result of the test, Spanish banks did 
not require further capital increases, despite the fact that the crite-
ria applied were more demanding than those in 2010 and that, 
once again, the degree of coverage attained in Spain, namely 93% 
of total assets, was far higher than the 50% minimum required by 
the EBA.
However, the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis during the 
summer of 2011, which took on a systemic nature, led the Com-
munity authorities to adopt a recapitalisation plan for major banks, 
which affected five Spanish institutions. Specifically, an extraordi-
nary capital buffer of a temporary nature – until market confidence 
problems are resolved – was established, linked to the estimated 
losses on the sovereign debt portfolio in accordance with market 
prices. Also, likewise temporarily, the Tier 15 ratio was raised to 
9%. The calculation of the new requirements, which was made on 
the basis of data as at September 2011, reflected additional needs 
for Spanish banks of €26.17 billion, to be covered by June this 
year. Moreover, the three previously existing funds were unified in 
a single Deposit Guarantee Fund for Credit Institutions, further re-
inforcing this vehicle’s capacity to shore up the solvency and 
sound functioning of banks.
Despite all these measures, the worsening economic situation in 
Spain and the difficulties in completing the ongoing review of Eu-
ropean governance contributed to the problems of confidence in 
the Spanish financial system remaining in place, and its major dif-
ficulties in gaining access to wholesale funding continued. A by no 
means insignificant portion of these difficulties continued to be 
linked to the sector’s high exposure to real estate development-
related assets and to doubts over their valuation, especially in 
those cases, such as loans linked to land or to developments in 
progress, where, owing to their lesser liquidity, it was more compli-
cated to obtain a market price. In an attempt to eliminate this 
source of uncertainty, the Government approved in February and 
May 2012 RDL 2/2012 and RDL 18/2012, respectively. This legis-
lation sets in place an accelerated and transparent process for the 
clean-up of potential losses associated with real estate assets. 
RDL 2/2012 includes, moreover, various other measures: incentives 
for consolidation operations; the improved governance of institu-
tions resulting from integration processes; the simplification of or-
ganisational and operational structures; the regulation of the distri-
bution of the surplus of savings banks that pursue their activity 
indirectly, and limits on the remuneration of the directors and man-
agers of institutions that have received aid from the FROB. For its 
part, RDL 18/2012 stipulates the obligation to take the foreclosed 
assets or those received in payment of debts linked to the real 
estate sector to a public limited company, other than the institu-
tion, for their management and sale. Also in May, the government 
entrusted the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness 
with drawing up two external and independent valuation reports 
on the extent of the clean-up of bank balance sheets.
Against this background, the Ministry and the Banco de España 
agreed on 21 May to hire Roland Berger and Oliver Wyman as in-
dependent appraisers to value, within the space of a month, the 
Spanish banking system’s balance sheets. In a second stage, au-
dit firms, which had not yet been selected at the time of this Re-
port going to press, will perform field work on the quality of the 
procedures for recognising and provisioning for loan losses. This 
stage will take longer.
The new measures on write-downs establish an increase in spe-
cific and general provisions6 and, in the case of problem assets 
relating to land and developments in progress7, they require a 
capital buffer that covers the potential losses on such assets. In 
this way, levels of coverage for the total real estate development-
related asset portfolio would be attained for 45% of their total 
amount8, which would be for 53% in the case of problem real 
estate assets and, within the latter, for 80% in the case of land 
and for 65% in the case of developments in progress. The ac-
companying panel gives a breakdown of the initial estimates of 
additional write-downs and of the increase in capital that the ap-
plication of these rules would entail, namely some €82 billion9, 
notably increasing the volume of those made between 2008 and 
end-2011 (€112 billion).
The February RDL gave institutions until 31 March to submit their 
plans to comply with the new requirements. On 17 April, following 
revision of the plans presented by the institutions, the Banco de 
España deemed that most of them had made this first additional 
clean-up and recapitalisation drive or that they were in a position 
6  In specific provisions the percentages set out in CBE 4/2004 are in-
creased and certain items are added, and in general provisions addi-
tional provisioning for a total of 30% of the outstanding balance of 
standard real estate exposures is introduced.
7  This would affect both assets already foreclosed and loans backed by 
these assets, and would require covering with capital the difference be-
tween the provisions already set aside on these items and the required 
coverage of 80% and 65% of their value.
8  The result of the sum of the outstanding balance of loans extended and the 
balance-sheet initial book value of assets foreclosed in payment of debt. 
9  This figure is based on the provisional estimate by the Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs and Competitiveness of the requirements arising from RDL 
18/2012.
3  Subsequently, the Unnim operation required an additional increase in 
capital of €380 million through the conversion into shares of the prefer-
ence shares held by the FROB as a result of the previous integration 
phase.
4 The FROB subsequently took control over another institution.
5  Basic capital comprising ordinary shares and reserves, although it in-
cludes other capital instruments arising from public aid.
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BOX 1.2PROGRESS IN THE CLEAN-UP, RECAPITALISATION AND RESTRUCTURING 
OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM (cont’d)
to do so without major difficulties. At other institutions, envisaged 
compliance would be a closer-run matter, although with reasona-
ble prospects of being achieved. In these latter cases, the Banco 
de España required additional measures on top of those initially 
proposed, along with contingency measures to withstand possible 
deviations. At the same time, it stated that it would monitor much 
more closely compliance with the plans. Further, of the total num-
ber of institutions, 27 (12 of them credit cooperatives) reported 
that they might take part in merger and acquisition operations 
which, if they materialised, would involve a slightly longer time 
margin in which to comply with the new requirements. Although 
envisaged under the rules, no institution then applied for interven-
tion by the FROB. In early May, the country’s fourth-biggest finan-
cial institution applied for the conversion of preference shares pre-
viously subscribed by the FROB into ordinary shares. As a result, 
the FROB will hold a very significant percentage of its capital. Sub-
sequently, this same institution agreed to asked the FROB to sub-
scribe an additional capital increase for an amount of €19 billion, 
as part of a new clean-up plan. 
In accordance with the May RDL, institutions have until 11 June to 
submit new plans to comply with the additional provisioning re-
quirements. Those that so need it, in the opinion of the institution 
or the Banco de España itself, may avail themselves of financial 
support from the FROB, either in the form of ordinary shares or 
securities convertible into shares, on an arm’s length basis.  
In parallel with these measures, the restructuring of the Spanish 
banking sector has moved ahead in 2011 and in 2012 to date. The 
mergers initiated in 2010 have been completed, other new mergers 
are under way and the change in the savings-bank legal organisa-
tional model has been implemented, leading to virtually all the insti-
tutions concerned transferring their financial activity to a commer-
cial bank (around 99% of the sub-sector’s risk-weighted assets). 
Taking stock, it can be seen that, as at March 2012, the 45 savings 
banks previously existing had been transformed into 11 banking 
institutions.10 This sub-sector concentrated all the aid received 
which, as can be seen in the adjoining table, amounted to €9.29 billion 
in the integration phase. With €4.18 billion used for recapitalisation 
and €6.59 billion for operations involving non-viable institutions11, 
the result is a total volume of aid of €20.07 billion (€13.87 billion 
provided by the FROB and €6.2 billion by the DGF).12
These developments have been accompanied, at the merged in-
stitutions, by an average reduction of around 11% in staffing and 
13% in the number of offices, in the period from December 2008 
to December 2011. Further, at all savings banks management 
teams have been renewed, both voluntarily and by force, with the 
entry of public or private investors.
10  Including the integration of Caja3 into Ibercaja and that of CEISS into 
Unicaja.
11  These figures show the result of the integration of Unnim into BBVA, 
which entailed the return to the FROB of all the funds provided via the 
instruments acquired in the integration and recapitalisation phases, €380 
million and €568 million, which accounted for 100% of the capital. Un-
nim’s assets and liabilities were then transferred to the BBVA for €1, with 
the DGF assuming the estimated losses on this operation (€953 million).
12  These figures do not include the additional capital requirements arising 
from the clean-up plan submitted by BFA-Bankia at the end of May 
2012. 
policies supporting specific modes of lending. These should help correct the market short-
comings whose effects tend to be more acute at times of great stress like the present and 
that may restrict the access to credit of solvent agents whose creditworthiness, nonethe-
less, is particularly difficult to evaluate. Special mention here should be given to the sup-
port to SMEs, channelled essentially through the ICO (Official Credit Institute). In any 
event, it should not be forgotten that neither the ICO nor, generally, this type of one-off 
policy can replace the role of a sound financial system in efficiently allocating financial 
resources in an economy.
In the budgetary area, the measures adopted in 2010 and 2011 sought first to ensure com-
pliance with the objectives laid down in the Stability Programme, and further, to reinforce 
the fiscal framework and improve the sustainability of public finances.
As to the first of these objectives, budgetary measures focused on implementing the ad-
justment plan designed in May 2010 and subsequently completed by the 2011 State 
Budget. This plan had been defined on the basis of a scenario of some recovery in activity, 
which would subsequently be revealed to be excessively benign, and aimed to reduce the 
budget deficit from 9.2% of GDP in 2010 to 6% of GDP in 2011, entailing a reduction in 
In 2011, the actual deficit 
figures substantially exceeded 
the initial projection…
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the structural deficit of 3.1 pp (from 7.8% to 4.7%)1 (see Chart 1.10). This ambitious plan 
resided chiefly on public spending cuts and encompassed all tiers of government. None-
theless, there was uncertainty over its actually being met owing both to the inertia of cer-
tain expenditure items and to the behaviour of local and regional government, whose 
budgetary effort had scarcely been discernible in the 2010 figures.
From the summer, a risk of slippage in the programmed overall general government target 
began to be perceptible. It was therefore necessary in August 2011 to adopt additional fiscal 
consolidation measures, with an estimated fiscal impact of 0.5 pp of GDP. Nonetheless, the 
cyclical downturn in the closing months of the year bore down even more on tax revenue and 
social security contributions, preventing attainment of the deficit target for that year.
Indeed, 2011 saw a substantial overrun in terms of the actual as opposed to the projected 
general government deficit, which stood at 8.9% of GDP. That marked a 2.9 pp deviation 
from the target set in the Stability Programme. All levels of government had a higher-than-
forecast deficit, but the biggest deviation was in the regional governments. Here, it 
amounted to 2.0 pp, which has affected the credibility of the budgetary projections and 
has increased the scale of the budgetary consolidation effort still needed.
These outturns allow some lessons to be drawn on severe fiscal consolidation processes 
in adverse cyclical situations and in a setting of fiscal decentralisation such as that prevail-
ing in Spain. The cyclical weakness has weighed on tax revenue. The composition of 
economic activity in 2011 may have influenced this result as it was very biased towards 
exports, whose impact on tax revenue is lower. But the deviations indicate that the fore-
casts of revenue were generally high, even for the macroeconomic scenario projected. 
Notable under revenue was the decline in indirect taxes, in particular excise duties and 
transfer tax and stamp tax, linked to real estate activity. In contrast, public spending con-
tracted on a scale similar to that established in the Stability Programme owing to the fact 
that less public investment than was budgeted for offset the upward deviations under the 
interest payments heading.
… confirming the difficulty of 
achieving effective 
adjustments in adverse 
cyclical situations…
1  This objective was in line with a deficit-correction trajectory which, according to the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
to which Spanish public finances were subject, should place the budget deficit in 2013 at 3% of GDP and which 
required a 1.5 pp reduction in the structural balance over the 2010-2013 period.
SOURCES: IGAE and Banco de España. 
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SOURCES: INE, IGAE, AMECO and Banco de España.
a Spanish National Accounts data, base year 2008.
b Volume indices. Rate of change.
c Rate of change, except the unemployment rate, which is a level. 
d Employment rate (16-64).
e Levels as a percentage of GDP. 
f Includes net capital transfers received.
g Annual average levels for the Madrid Stock Exchange General Index, interest rates and exchange rates, and rates of change foQjnancial assets and liabilities.
h 1999 Q1 = 100.
i 1999 Q1 = 100. Measured with unit labour costs.
j Includes cash equivalents, other bank liabilities and money market funds.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DEMAND AND OUTPUT (b)
    GDP 4.1 3.5 0.9 -3.7 -0.1 0.7
    Private consumption 4.0 3.5 -0.6 -4.3 0.8 -0.1
    Government consumption 4.6 5.6 5.9 3.7 0.2 -2.2
    Gross capital formation 8.0 4.2 -4.2 -16.5 -6.1 -5.2
    Equipment investment 8.2 10.2 -2.9 -22.3 5.1 1.4
    Construction investment 6.7 2.4 -5.8 -15.4 -10.1 -8.1
    Housing 6.6 1.4 -9.1 -22.1 -9.9 -4.9
    Other construction 6.8 3.6 -1.6 -7.6 -10.4 -11.2
    Exports of goods and services 6.7 6.7 -1.0 -10.4 13.5 9.0
    Imports of goods and services 10.2 8.0 -5.2 -17.2 8.9 -0.1
EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, COSTS AND PRICES (c)
    Total employment 3.5 3.0 -0.2 -6.5 -2.6 -2.0
    Employment rate (d) 65.7 66.6 65.3 60.6 59.4 58.5
    Unemployment rate 8.5 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1 21.6
    Compensation per employee 3.9 4.7 6.1 4.3 0.0 0.8
    Unit labour costs 3.3 4.2 4.9 1.4 -2.6 -1.9
    GDP dekator 4.1 3.3 2.4 0.1 0.4 1.4
    Consumer price index (12-month % change) 2.7 4.2 1.4 0.8 3.0 2.4
    Consumer price index (annual average) 3.5 2.8 4.1 -0.3 1.8 3.2
    Consumer price differential with the euro area (HICP) 1.4 0.7 0.9 -0.5 0.4 0.3
SAVING, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL BALANCE (e)
    Resident sectors: saving (f) 22.6 21.4 19.9 19.7 19.3 18.7
    General government (f) 6.0 6.0 -0.3 -6.6 -5.4 -5.8
    Resident sectors: investment 31.0 31.0 29.1 24.4 23.3 22.1
    General government   3.6 4.1 4.2 4.6 3.9 2.7
    Resident sectors: domestic net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) -8.4 -9.6 -9.2 -4.7 -4.0 -3.4
    General government 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.3 -8.5
    General government gross debt 39.7 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.2 68.5
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL INIDICATORS (g)
    ECB minimum bid rate on MROs 2.8 3.9 3.9 1.2 1.0 1.3
    Ten-year government bond yield 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.2 5.4
    Synthetic bank lending rate 4.6 5.7 6.2 3.8 3.3 4.1
    Madrid Stock Exchange General Index (Dec 1985 = 100) 1,324.0 1,631.8 1,278.3 1,042.4 1,076.5 971.8
    Dollar/euro exchange rate 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4
    Nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (h) 100.8 101.9 103.3 103.4 101.9 101.7
    Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis developed countries (i) 111.8 115.8 119.1 116.2 112.3 108.8
    Real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro area (i) 110.3 113.6 115.0 111.7 109.4 106.3
    Cash and cash equivalents 11.3 -3.2 -3.3 8.5 -0.2 -1.6
    Liquid assets (j) 8.4 8.3 9.7 0.8 3.2 0.1
    Households: total jnancing 19.6 12.5 4.4 -0.3 0.2 -2.4
    Non-jnancial corporations: total jnancing 28.0 17.7 8.2 -1.4 0.6 -1.8
MAIN INDICATORS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a) TABLE 1.1
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The budgetary deviation in 2011 has revealed the presence of significant failings in the insti-
tutional design available for the budgetary monitoring, early-warning and control mecha-
nisms, more markedly so in the case of regional and local government. Despite having budg-
etary stability legislation that set ceilings on the deficit for all levels of government and a 
procedure for the correction of imbalances, the monitoring and control mechanisms, along 
with those intended to ensure compliance with the targets set, proved clearly insufficient.
The shortcomings in the availability of information on the regional and local government out-
turn prevented the detection in time of budgetary deviations and led to a delay in the rule-
enforcement mechanisms being activated. Accordingly, the regular publication of the region-
al and local government outturn is vital, with the same periodicity, degree of detail, lag and 
accessibility as for central government. Also, the information in the budget should furnish 
data on both central and regional government in National Accounts terms, which is the rele-
vant definition for the fiscal rules in place, making explicit all the necessary information so as 
to evaluate the appropriateness of revenue projections to the macroeconomic scenario. Fur-
thermore, the mechanisms enforcing correction of the budget deficits proved insufficient. On 
one hand, the information in the plans for their correction was not always public and its format 
prevented comparison with the initial budgets. On the other, the conditionality of the authori-
sations to incur debt was not automatically applicable, which detracted from their usefulness.
In order to correct the shortcomings, to reinforce the budgetary framework and to improve 
the sustainability of public finances in the medium term, significant initiatives have been 
set in train. In September 2011 a reform of the Constitution was approved to incorporate 
the deficit and debt ceilings set at the European level.2 This was subsequently implement-
ed in the Organic Law on Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability, the provisions of 
which are fully in keeping with the European governance reforms.
Along with a firm commitment to budgetary stability, this legislation includes stricter re-
porting requirements and new coercive mechanisms to ensure compliance with the fiscal 
targets for all levels of government. The possibility of establishing sanctions is included, 
the automatic adjustment of regional government spending is obligatory in specific cases 
of non-compliance, and provision is also made for the imposition of adjustment measures 
by central government that local and regional government must observe. The rigorous and 
immediate application of the legislation, particularly concerning the monitoring and control 
mechanisms, and those intended to enforce compliance with the targets set by all tiers of 
government, is decisive for ensuring adherence to the fiscal consolidation path.
The “non-bailout” clause envisaged in the aforementioned law is crucial for preventing the 
cost of inappropriate fiscal behaviour by one level of government from passing through to 
the others and so that the capital markets may exert disciplining effects. At the same time, 
regional and local government are allowed to request extraordinary liquidity-support 
measures of central government. In that case, they are required to submit a plan that en-
sures the attainment of fiscal targets, and the outlay in tranches of the financial aid will be 
conditional upon compliance with such targets. In this respect, in the opening months of 
the year the Government set in train various financial-support mechanisms for regional 
and local government so as to facilitate the refinancing of their previous debts or the 
… and the presence of 
significant failings in the 
institutional design for 
budgetary monitoring, early-
warning and control 
mechanisms, especially in 
respect of the regional 
governments
Progress in fiscal 
consolidation hinges crucially 
on reinforcing the budgetary 
framework. The reform of the 
Constitution and the Organic 
Law on Budgetary Stability 
and Financial Sustainability 
are two key steps in this 
connection
2  Previously, in July, a rule on the growth of public spending for central government and for large municipalities had 
been introduced. Under this rule, the rate of increase of public spending could not annually exceed the econo-
my’s medium-term nominal growth rate; its application to regional government was subject to approval by the 
Fiscal and Financial Policy Council.
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payment of trade creditors. The financing mechanisms agreed upon require the definition 
and fulfilment of adjustment plans whose duration will span the debt repayment period. To 
prevent these mechanisms from diluting the incentives for regional and local government 
to strictly meet their budgetary targets, it is essential to apply rigorous conditionality to the 
provision of the funds. The economic and financial plans approved by the Fiscal and Fi-
nancial Policy Council to re-balance regional government finances on 17 May entail 
spending-reduction and revenue-increasing measures which, in principle, are consistent 
with compliance with the conditionality requirements.
Lastly, mention should be made of the approval in July 2011 of the Law on Social Secu-
rity Reform, in light of its importance for the sustainability of public finances. This legisla-
tion progressively raises the retirement age, extends the number of years taken into ac-
count for calculating the final pension and includes a factor of sustainability that will 
provide for the adaptation, from 2026, of the parameters of the system to future demo-
graphic developments.
On 30 March the Government approved the State Budget for 2012, setting the deficit pro-
grammed for this year at 3.5% of GDP, a figure compatible with the overall general govern-
ment deficit of 5.3%, approved some weeks earlier. The projected decline in the State 
deficit is based chiefly on spending cuts – affecting goods and services purchases, public 
investment and capital transfers – and draws essentially on the increase in direct taxation 
(personal income tax and corporation tax).
For the reasons outlined earlier, over the rest of the year it will be necessary to ensure 
highly rigorous budget implementation and swift application of the mechanisms that al-
low any emergence of slippage to be detected sufficiently in advance, so as to offset this 
with additional measures. If this were the case, further adjustments to current expendi-
ture would have to be made, given that the leeway for measures affecting capital spend-
ing has narrowed enormously. Also, new tax measures would have to be introduced, 
preferably relating to indirect taxation, with less of a distorting effect on growth and re-
source allocation.
The updating of the Stability Programme for the 2011-2015 period, which the Govern-
ment approved on 27 April, confirmed the path of adjustment to 2013, when the deficit 
is projected to stand at 3% of GDP and the public debt ratio at 82.3% of GDP. It also 
set deficit targets for 2014 and 2015 of 2.2% and 1.1%, respectively, which would see 
a reduction in the public debt ratio to 80.8% in the latter year. Almost 75% of the adjust-
ment envisaged for the 2011-2015 period would be made in the first two years of the 
Programme. It would essentially be structural in nature and 80% of it would focus on 
spending cuts.
Of all the factors responsible for the limited progress made in correcting the budget deficit 
in 2011, the extreme weakness of the labour market and the absence of growth stand to 
the fore. Without a pick-up in employment, it will be more costly to further fiscal consolida-
tion. This is because the increases in revenue will be limited and because the adjustment 
in primary expenditure will be hampered by the need to earmark a substantial portion of 
this item to the payment of unemployment benefits. Such a scenario might further be ex-
acerbated by ongoing financial deleveraging and lead to increases in bad debts, with the 
subsequent adverse impact on the quality of bank balance sheets. Ultimately, this would 
have highly adverse consequences for potential growth, whose possibilities would be 
checked by the foreseeable loss of demographic dynamism.
Without a pick-up in 
employment and in activity, 
progress in fiscal 
consolidation will be more 
costly…
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It is thus a pressing matter to boost structural reforms enhancing the supply side of the econ-
omy. The cornerstone of this strategy involves making the labour market work efficiently, so as 
to generate employment, provide suitable incentives to smooth the reallocation of resources 
across sectors and alter the market’s pattern of adjustment in the face of adverse shocks.
The Spanish labour market had been one of the main handicaps of our institutional frame-
work. Traditionally structured around a dual hiring system – with dismissal costs that were 
high for permanent contracts and low for temporary ones – and collective bargaining ar-
rangements in which an intermediate level of bargaining was predominant, thereby en-
couraging highly uniform wage increases bearing little relation to the specific situation of 
companies and adding rigidity to non-wage conditions in such a way as to stymie produc-
tivity, the labour market has amplified the effects of the crisis. Economic policy measures 
to tackle this problem were launched in June 2010. These included a reform of hiring 
mechanisms that did not alter the existing types of contract and the introduction of means 
to boost companies’ internal flexibility, without changing the collective bargaining system, 
a change that would be postponed until July 2011. In both cases the measures were par-
tial and did not alter the key features of the labour framework.
In January this year the social partners entered into an agreement with recommendations 
of wage moderation for the 2012-2014 period and amendments to the definition of and 
activation procedures for wage indexation clauses, the application of which would reduce 
the nominal inertia of wages. Further, in March, the Parliament ratified a new labour market 
reform3, with a more comprehensive scope than that of those implemented to date. 
Changes to collective bargaining have been made to increase decentralisation in the bar-
gaining process and to bolster companies’ internal flexibility. Contract-termination mecha-
nisms have also been substantially changed and a new permanent contract has been 
created for SMEs, which entails a series of tax incentives.4
The amendments to the reform improve key aspects in the functioning of the labour market 
in Spain. The overall effects will be conducive to job creation and job stability. However, given 
the marked weakness of activity lying immediately ahead, if the reform’s internal flexibility 
measures to adapt working conditions to the specific needs of each company are not exten-
sively harnessed, there might still be some further adjustment to the level of employment. The 
reform should also contribute to containing the growth of labour costs and thus boosting the 
competitiveness of Spanish companies. To do this, though, conditions would have to be re-
inforced so that business margins do not absorb and curtail the gains arising from cost mod-
eration (see Box 1.3). In any event, the reform should ideally be completed with more ambi-
tious active policy measures that include an exhaustive assessment of the programmes 
under way, closer links with passive policies and alternatives to hiring incentives which, so 
far, have proven relatively ineffective in terms of aggregate employment creation.
To fully reap the benefits of the labour reform, fresh momentum must be given to the liber-
alisation of product markets, promoting competition in the most sheltered sectors. Com-
petition-fostering policies are the main instrument for disciplining the formation of margins 
and for increasing the sensitivity of price formation to demand conditions. Both issues are 
key to the proper functioning of the competitiveness channel, which is so important for 
exiting the crisis, as is analysed in the following chapter. Moreover, events in recent years 
… making it a priority to boost 
structural reforms, a 
cornerstone of which is labour 
market reform
The labour reform approved in 
March improves key aspects 
of labour market workings and 
is conducive to job creation…
… although to achieve these 
effects, fresh momentum must 
be given to the liberalisation of 
markets for goods and 
services…
3  Royal Decree-Law 3/2012 on urgent labour market reform measures.
4  A description of the reform can be found in “La evolución del empleo y del paro en 2011, según la EPA”, Boletín 
Económico, February 2012, Banco de España.
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BOX 1.3LABOUR REFORM AND COMPETITIVENESS
Exiting the current double-dip recession in the Spanish economy 
will necessarily involve restoring competitiveness at levels which 
allow, by means of a forceful export impulse, a recovery in activity 
and employment. In this respect the labour market reform in March 
this year, along with the new collective bargaining framework 
agreement (CBFA), may induce wage moderation that contributes 
effectively to achieving these objectives.
Under the new CBFA, the social partners agreed new wage guide-
lines for the 2012-2014 period, which include the recommendation 
that wage increases should not exceed 0.5% in 2012 and 0.6% in 
2013, and should stand between 0.6% and 1.5% in 2014.1 Sub-
stantial changes in the design of wage indexation clauses are also 
recommended, which may reduce nominal wage inertia and help 
entrench moderate behaviour in this variable.2 In light of the expe-
rience of the previous CBFA, there is a risk that the agreed recom-
mendations will not be strictly adhered to3; accordingly, there 
should be insistence as to the need for the social partners to ef-
fectively pass these recommendations through to the collective 
agreements currently under negotiation.
Turning to reforms, in March this year a new labour market re-
form was approved.4 Among other aspects, it contains a set of 
measures aimed at enabling companies more readily to adapt 
themselves to changes in the economic situation through means 
other than labour shedding, such as changes to working hours 
and to wages. The measures include most notably: i) priority in 
respect of application to firm-level agreements as opposed to 
industry-, region- and nationwide agreements in a broad list of 
matters (wages, working hours, distribution of work time, adap-
tation to professional status arrangements, etc.); ii) extension of 
the areas in which employers can substantially change working 
conditions or decide not to apply conditions agreed in a collec-
tive agreement at a higher-than-firm level; iii) a maximum ceiling 
1  Based on GDP growth in 2013, whereby the wage increase will not ex-
ceed 0.6% if GDP grows below 1%, 1% if GDP grows between 1% and 
2%, and 1.5% if GDP grows above 2%.
2  Specifically, it is recommended they should be activated once inflation 
exceeds 2% at the end of the year, instead of the increase effectively 
agreed upon in each collective agreement, and that indexed payments 
are not built into wages. Moreover, if Spanish inflation exceeds that of 
the euro area, the latter figure will be used to calculate the excess. Ad-
ditionally, in the event of significant rises in oil prices (over 10%), the 
benchmark inflation indicator will exclude the heating and vehicle fuel 
items. In this way the moderating impact of the CBFA is reinforced, 
preventing potential transitory increases in inflation from feeding 
through to wages.
3  The previous CBFA recommended a wage increase of below 1% for 
2010, a figure to which there was no adherence even in newly signed 
agreements, in which a 1.2% wage increase was agreed (rising to 1.7% 
on taking the wage indexation clauses into account). Furthermore, only 
55% of the newly signed agreements settled on wage increases below 
1% that year. Nor was there a high degree of compliance in respect of 
wage indexation clauses, where it was recommended that they should 
be of a multi-year nature, which was not generally passed through to 
collective bargaining agreements.
4  Royal Decree-Law 3/2012, approved on 10 February, ratified on 8 March 
as a draft bill, and currently under passage through Parliament, where 
amendments may be made.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Accumulated level differences in percentage points.
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of two years on the applicability of collective agreements follow-
ing the explanation of their term of validity (known as “ultra-ac-
tivity”), and iv) simplification of the procedures for lay-off 
schemes involving shorter working days and contract suspen-
sion. The labour reform has also considerably reduced dismissal 
costs for permanent employees, making the related procedures 
more flexible.
Overall, these measures will foreseeably be conducive to increased 
decentralisation of collective bargaining and to greater wage flex-
ibility tailored to firms’ specific conditions. That will help redress 
the scant wage differentiation between firms and industries in-
duced by the bargaining structure in force to date. In turn, the 
changes will also result in the greater adaptability of working con-
ditions to potential changes in the economic situation. On the 
whole, the interaction of the reform and internal flexibility meas-
ures with the new CBFA should contribute to containing labour 
costs and to boosting competitiveness.
In order to assess the impact of wage moderation on GDP and 
employment, simulation exercises have been conducted with 
the Quarterly Macroeconomic Model of the Banco de España 
(MTBE) where we calibrate the effects of greater moderation 
arising from the estimated impact of the CBFA and the labour 
reform on growth and employment. Strict compliance with the 
wage guidelines set by the new CBFA for the 2012-2014 peri-
od might give rise to a scenario of lower wage growth, of 0.6 
pp in 2012 and 1 pp in 2013 and 2014, compared with a 
benchmark scenario under which the Agreement had not been 
reached.5 Added to this effect is a very tentative estimate of 
the additional impact that might arise from the recent labour 
market reform, chiefly as a consequence of an increase in the 
number of firm-level and working-day-reduction agreements, 
and of greater use of wage opt-outs. As a result, it is assumed 
that the overall impact of the CBFA and of the labour reform 
might lower wage growth in respect of the benchmark sce-
nario in a range of between 0.6 pp and 1 pp in 2012 and be-
tween 1 pp and 2 pp in 2013 and 2014.
The MTBE simulations show that the simulated wage modera-
tion scenario would have a positive effect on GDP and employ-
ment growth, although the scale of this hinges crucially on the 
extent to which lower labour costs pass through to final prices. 
If wage moderation is accompanied by an adjustment of a simi-
lar scale in prices (blue lines in panel 1), the resulting gains in 
competitiveness would prompt an increase in the demand for 
Spanish products that would activate other expansionary pro-
cesses. At the same time, the purchasing power of wage in-
come would be maintained and, consequently, that would give 
rise to a higher level of private consumption and investment. 
Overall, the cumulative increases in employment and in GDP to 
2014 would be in a range of between 1 pp and 3.5 pp and be-
tween 1 pp and 2.5 pp, respectively, significantly contributing to 
BOX 1.3LABOUR REFORM AND COMPETITIVENESS (cont’d)
5 The inertia in wage rates added by multi-year agreements entered into in 
previous years is what explains the difference in the impact between 2012 
and the two following years.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year percentage change.
b GDP dekator adjusted for tax increase.
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reducing the unemployment rate. In contrast, under an extreme 
scenario, in which the moderation of wage costs to not pass 
through to prices because margins widen by the same amount 
(red lines in panel 1), the simulations denote a much smaller 
impact both on GDP and on employment, since this more infla-
tionary behaviour would deprive the economy of the expansion-
ary effects of price moderation on exports and private con-
sumption.
In this respect, the recent behaviour of inflation and of unit labour 
costs (see panel 2) indicates there is room for the containment in 
ULCs to pass through to prices with greater intensity than that ob-
served to date, which would enable the potential expansionary ef-
fects of a wage moderation scenario to be maximised. This result 
highlights the importance of complementing the recent labour re-
form with a product-market liberalisation drive that promotes com-
petition in the most sheltered sectors and enhances the feed-through 
of cost moderation to prices. Indeed, on the evidence available for 
other countries6, the simultaneous application of both types of re-
forms reinforces the beneficial effects of labour reforms (by promot-
ing employment generation to a greater extent) and mitigates their 
costs (by helping maintain the purchasing power of wages).
BOX 1.3LABOUR REFORM AND COMPETITIVENESS (cont’d)
6 Having examined four European experiences of far-reaching labour mar-
ket reform in the past 20 years (in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Ireland and Denmark) that were successful in terms of reducing unemploy-
ment, Annett concludes that the gains in employment were greater thanks 
to the fact that the reforms were complemented by product-market liberal-
ising processes [A. Annett (2007), Lessons from Successful Labor Market 
Reformers in Europe, IMF Policy Discussion Paper 07/1].
have highlighted the need for all sectors and activities to adapt effectively to the environ-
ment of flexibility that Monetary Union participation requires. In this connection, reforms 
promoting genuine gains in efficiency and productivity are vital, with a view to strengthen-
ing the sources of medium and long-term growth.
Numerous measures affecting a wide number of sectors and activities need to be taken. 
Many are squarely on the list of economic policy measures the Government wishes to 
deploy in the coming months, as envisaged in the National Reforms Programme (NRP) 
approved on 27 April. The housing sector has undergone a drastic adjustment in recent 
years, but this has not been accompanied by fundamental changes in some of the factors 
that contributed to the previous boom. The tax treatment of house purchases following the 
reintroduction of tax relief continues to be very favourable to owner-occupiers. Also, until 
very recently, rental regulations, which maintain very strict obligatory periods that discour-
age supply, had not been amended. Some of these aspects, particularly the term of rent-
als, are under reconsideration in the recently approved draft bill of measures to invigorate 
the house rental market. As is also indicated in the NRP, measures to boost competition in 
transport, retail trade and professional services, and to remove obstacles to business 
start-ups, will have appreciable effects on cost and price formation and on productivity.
The proper functioning of competition-monitoring agencies and of those entrusted with 
regulating the network industries is vital for further progress in the much-needed process 
of liberalisation. The ongoing reform of these agencies should primarily be to strengthen 
their independence, their accountability channels and their technical capacity, ensuring 
that sectoral experts can deliver decisions that counter the pressures that still emerge in 
some of the industries more sheltered from competition. Changes of an organisational 
nature and in the distribution of functions should not, under any circumstances, detract 
from the attainment of these objectives.
Among the network industries, the energy sector merits particular attention, as is also 
envisaged in the NRP. The process of liberalisation is still far from completion and there is 
... by means of regulatory 
changes in a wide number of 
sectors and activities…
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broad scope to step up competition in all sectors. To redress these problems, resolute 
progress on vertical deintegration would be necessary, with the segregation of ownership 
between network activities and production and marketing activities, where it would have 
to be ensured that the market structure were sufficiently competitive. In the hydrocarbons 
industry there is room to increase competition in the distribution segment.
Under energy activities, the electricity industry has its own particular set of problems. 
These must be urgently resolved taking a medium and long-term view so as to redress 
certain imbalances built up in recent years arising from economic regulation in various 
segments, while enabling competitiveness to combine with safety as regards supply and 
the protection of the environment.
Finally, greater transparency in energy price formation, and in particular the remuneration 
of regulated activities, is essential to improve the functioning of the market. Unquestion-
ably, the Law on Transparency, Access to Public Information and Good Governance, which 
is applied to all industries in which the general government sector intervenes, may contrib-
ute – along with the better functioning of regulatory agencies – to this objective.
To boost productivity gains, moves must be made to overcome the problems of education 
in Spain, which displays low levels of quality on international standards. It would further be 
advisable to foment the use of the new information and communications technologies (in 
the educational system, and in the continuous training of employees and the unemployed) 
and to offer incentives for small firms to incorporate new technologies. To improve the 
quality of technological capital, efforts should focus on nurturing innovation in the private 
sector, which requires assessing the support tools in place and strengthening the connec-
tion between basic research and companies.
... training in new 
technologies, the fostering of 
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